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— Comment —
“Look then to be well edified,
when the fool delivers the
madman” : Insider-Trading
Regulation after
Salman v. United States
1

“Today, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously and ‘easily’ rejected the Second Circuit’s novel reinterpretation of insider trading
law in U.S. v. Newman. In its swiftly decided opinion, the Court
stood up for common sense and affirmed what we have been arguing from the outset—that the law absolutely prohibits insiders
from advantaging their friends and relatives at the expense of the
trading public. Today’s decision is a victory for fair markets and
those who believe that the system should not be rigged.”
—Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New
York – December 6, 2016 2
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Introduction
Perhaps the above quote tells the reader everything she needs to
know about the case in question. After all, Justice Alito pointed to the
writing on the wall when he declared that “this case involves ‘precisely

1.

William Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, in The Norton Shakespeare
V.1.85–86 (Stephen Greenblatt et al. eds., 2015).

2.

Colby Hamilton, Bharara Praises Supreme Court Decision on Insider
Trading, Politico (Dec. 6, 2016, 12:33 PM), http://www.politico.com/
states/new-york/albany/story/2016/12/scotus-insider-trading-decision-hailedas-a-victory-by-bharara-107844 [https://perma.cc/84M3-T7GB].
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the gift of confidential information to a trading relative’ that Dirks 3
envisioned.” 4 Hence, what can we take away from an opinion that, in
both result and diction, is unequivocally clear? As legal scholars, we
know that judicial restraint leaves open enough questions to keep the
well of Note and Comment topics from running dry. In that spirit, the
following pages explore the interstices in Justice Alito’s opinion, specifically the plausible ambiguities the Court mentions but, in the name of
judicial restraint, purposefully declines to address. 5
Along these lines, circuit splits often result in countless speculative
works of legal scholarship. 6 But in Salman v. United States, 7 the Supreme Court laid to rest the question of whether the government can
convict a tippee who trades on inside information if the sole benefit to

3.

Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). Dirks established that liability for insider
trading may arise when an insider makes a gift of confidential information
to a trading relative or friend. Id. at 664.

4.

Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 429 (2016) (quoting United States
v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2015)).

5.

See infra Part III (discussing insider trading regulation after Salman).

6.

See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, An Insider Trading Case Heads to the Supreme
Court, 2016–2017 Sup. Ct. Preview 78, 81 (2016) (predicting correctly
that, in Salman, “the government [will] . . . get what it wanted in the
Newman case . . . a broad reading of liability for tipping inside information”);
Rachel K. Paulose, Must a Tipper Receive a Pecuniary Benefit to Establish
Liability in Insider Trading Cases?, 44 Preview U.S. Sup. Ct. Cas. 11, 14
(2016) (predicting that “[a] reversal of Salman would be consistent with the
Court’s concern that the government prove scienter in criminal cases”);
Zachary J. Gubler, Comment, Reframing United States v. Salman, 165 U.
Pa. L. Rev. Online 1, 8–9 (2016) (arguing that “the Court should clarify
that insider trading liability results from the misappropriation of information,
and under that theory of liability, tipper-tippee liability is not dependent on
a personal benefit,” which is farther than the Court was willing to go);
Katherine Drummonds, Note, Resuscitating Dirks: How the Salman “Gift
Theory” of Tipper-Tippee Personal Benefit Would Improve Insider Trading
Law, 53 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 833, 858 (2016) (predicting correctly that the
Court will “uphold the ‘gift theory’ of the personal benefit requirement for
tipper-tippee insider trading liability”); Shannon Seiferth, Note, No More
Quid Pro Quo: Abandoning the Personal Benefit Requirement in Insider
Trading Law, 50 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 175, 214 (2016) (arguing that
Congress should pass a statute that “prevent[s] insider trading in the sort of
circumstances where it seems morally reprehensible, without chilling the use
of inside information for legitimate business purposes”); Sara Almousa,
Comment, Friends with Benefits? Clarifying the Role Relationships Play in
Satisfying the Personal Benefit Requirement under Tipper-Tippee Liability,
23 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1251, 1280 (2016) (predicting correctly that,
“[w]hile the Court finally agreed to rule on the [personal-benefit] issue, it will
more likely adopt one of the circuit court’s interpretations”).

7.

137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
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the tipper is their relationship with a “trading relative or friend.”8
Absent a tangible benefit to the tipper, this “gift-theory” of liability9
permits the government to convict a trading tippee exclusively because
of their relationship with the tipper. 10 Salman, therefore, refined the
understanding of a “personal benefit” in insider-trading law. 11
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on Salman’s appeal from the
Ninth Circuit because of a contemporaneous and diverging opinion by
the Second Circuit, 12 which resulted in the aforementioned circuit
split. 13 In United States v. Newman, 14 the Second Circuit overturned
the tippees’ convictions on the grounds that the tippers, who were
corporate insiders that indirectly passed inside information to the
tippees via the tippees’ analysts, 15 did not receive a “personal benefit”
from their tips. 16 This prompted the Supreme Court to grant certiorari
in Salman, which culminated in a resounding win for the government. 17
Since “circuit splits [are purported to] . . . provide a reliable and
objective measure of judicial performance,” 18 we are poised to review
Justice Alito’s opinion in Salman, which the Court joined
8.

See id. at 427 (holding that a tipper breaches their fiduciary duty by making
a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend).

9.

To demonstrate, Justice Ginsburg asked Defense Counsel what would
happen if the insider made the trade themselves and then gifted the proceeds
to the relative. Defense counsel agreed that the insider would be guilty under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012), to
which Justice Ginsburg remarked “So what’s the difference, if the insider
trades and . . . makes the proceeds a gift, or if he just says, you do the trade;
here’s the gift?” Oral Argument at 1:32, Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct.
420 (2016) (No. 15-628), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-628 [https://
perma.cc/AP4W-6G43].

10.

Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 429.

11.

Id. at 423.

12.

United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).

13.

See Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 425 (“We granted certiorari to resolve the tension
between the Second Circuit’s Newman decision and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case.”).

14.

773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).

15.

Id. at 442.

16.

Id.

17.

See Aruna Viswanatha & Brent Kendall, Supreme Court Hardens Stance on
Insider Trading, Wall St. J. (Dec. 7, 2016, 1:44 PM), http://www.
wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-backs-prosecutors-over-tips-from-friends-andfamily-in-insider-trading-cases-1481038798 [https://perma.cc/VD6B-NW4Q]
(arguing that “the unanimous opinion [in Salman] restores some of the power
the government lost in a 2014 federal court case”).

18.

Eric Hansford, Note, Measuring the Effects of Specialization with Circuit
Split Resolutions, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 1145, 1161 (2011).
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unanimously, 19 and evaluate how it impacts the future of insider-trading
jurisprudence, specifically in the realm of “personal benefit.”

I. Overview of the “Personal Benefit” Requirement
Under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 20 and Rule
10b-5, 21 which the Securities and Exchange Commission promulgated
pursuant to its powers under § 10(b), a person is guilty of insider
trading if the Government can prove: “(i) the existence of a relationship
affording access to information intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose, and (ii) unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to
take advantage of that information by trading without [public] disclosure.” 22 Wang and Steinberg describe the combination of § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 as “one of the most potent weapons” in the federal arsenal
for policing insider trading. 23 Defense counsel in Salman, however, correctly argued that “no statute defines the elements of [insider
trading].” 24 The crime is a species of what some commentators call “federal common law.” 25 Thus, for “personal benefit” purposes, our inquiry
focuses on the second prong of this two-prong test, which the SEC

19.

Supra note 17 and accompanying text.

20.

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).

21.

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016).

22.

Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980); see also Juliet P.
Kostritsky, Comment, Rationalizing Liability for Nondisclosure under 10b5: Equal Access to Information and United States v. Chiarella, 1980 Wis.
L. Rev. 162, 192 (1980) (explaining that “[t]he test based on the presence
or absence of a motive to obtain personal profit goes to the heart of 10b-5,
which is a concern that depriving investors of equal access to information
can impair investor confidence and the capital markets”).

23.

William K.S. Wang & Marc I. Steinberg, Insider Trading § 1.2, 3
(3d ed. 2010).

24.

Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 0:32. Defense Counsel went on to argue
that “this is a statute that doesn’t even mention insider trading, much less
tipping or personal benefit.” Id. at 1:50; see also United States v. Newman,
773 F.3d 438, 445 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[N]either the statute nor the regulations
issued pursuant to it, including Rule 10b-5, expressly prohibit insider trading.
Rather, the unlawfulness of insider trading is predicated on the notion that
insider trading is a type of securities fraud proscribed by Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.” (citing Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226–30)).

25.

See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Law and Policy 29
(2014) (“The modern insider trading prohibition thus is a creature of SEC
administrative actions and judicial opinions, only loosely tied to the statutory
language and its legislative history.”).
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announced in the seminal case In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 26 and the
Supreme Court subsequently adopted in Chiarella. 27
In Cady, Roberts, the SEC opined that “information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose” must also “not [be] for the personal benefit of anyone.” 28 This applies to the tipper, the tippee, and
even the elusive second- and third-level (and beyond) “remote tippees.” 29 We will come to appreciate, however, that the chief concern for
tippees is whether the tipper receives a personal benefit from their tip.30
Nonetheless, “personal benefits” come in both obvious and not-so-obvious forms, 31 some of which we will survey to grasp the possible implications of the “personal benefit” test after Salman. 32
Following Cady, Roberts, courts have continued to distill the term
“personal benefit,” perhaps most notably in the landmark case Dirks v.
SEC. 33 In Dirks, the Supreme Court held that “the initial inquiry is
whether there has been a breach of duty by the insider,” which “requires
courts to focus on objective criteria, i.e., whether the insider receives a
direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as pecuniary
gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings.” 34
Because Dirks was essentially a whistleblower to a massive fraud,
however, the Court had difficulty applying this framework to him. 35 He
was not a company insider and, in fact, some argue that his disclosure
played a vital role in uncovering one of the most egregious accounting
frauds in American history. 36 Thus, it was not immediately clear what
26.

40 SEC 907, 912 (1961).

27.

Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 222.

28.

Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC at 912 (emphasis added).

29.

See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 25 at 64–65 (arguing that although
“remote tippees” can be liable for insider trading, “it often will be difficult
to prosecute tipping chain cases, because of the potential difficulties inherent
in proving the requisite knowledge on the part of remote tippees”).

30.

See id. at 59 (“What Dirks proscribes is not a breach of any duty, however,
but solely a breach of the duty of loyalty forbidding fiduciaries to personally
benefit from the disclosure.”) (emphasis added).

31.

See id. at 60–61 (explaining that a “personal benefit” can arise from many
situations, some of which are a quid pro quo, a reputational benefit, sexual
favors, and gifts).

32.

See infra Part III (discussing the enforcement of insider trading laws after
Salman).

33.

463 U.S. 646 (1983).

34.

Id. at 663.

35.

Id. at 654.

36.

See id. at 652 n.8 (explaining that “[l]argely thanks to Dirks one of the most
infamous frauds in recent memory was uncovered and exposed, while the
record shows that the SEC repeatedly missed opportunities to investigate
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the tipper’s benefit was in revealing this information to Dirks. Yet, the
Government still attempted to satisfy this requirement to justify an
insider-trading conviction against him. Justice Powell clarified, however, “that there is no general duty to disclose before trading on material nonpublic information.” 37 Further, Justice Powell explained that
“not ‘all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities transaction’ . . . come within the ambit of Rule 10b-5.” 38 The requisite concern is whether the breach of fiduciary duty is the result of deliberate
“manipulation or deception.” 39
Still, the Government persisted in its argument that Dirks “breached a duty which he had assumed as a result of knowingly receiving
confidential information from [Equity Funding] insiders,” 40 and that
“tippees such as Dirks who receive non-public, material information
from insiders become ‘subject to the same duties as [the] insiders.’” 41
But this argument did not sway the Dirks Court; it summarily rejected
this reasoning and held that “the test is whether the insider personally
will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.” 42 Because the
insiders did not personally benefit from Dirks’s disclosure, there was no
breach of duty to the shareholders, and because the insiders did not
breach their duty, “there [was] no derivative breach” by Dirks. 43
The Dirks Court based its decision on the fact that “the tippers
received no monetary or personal benefit for revealing Equity Funding’s
secrets, nor was their purpose to make a gift of valuable information to
Dirks.” 44 Hence, the Court overturned Dirks’s conviction because “the
tippers were motivated by a desire to expose the fraud,” 45 not to receive
Equity Funding”) (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 829 (D.C. Cir.
1982)); but see Bainbridge, supra note 25, at 43 n.16 (“The extent to which
Dirks should be credited with exposing the Equity Funding fraud is a matter
of debate. Arguably, it was not until state insurance regulators from California
and Illinois conducted a surprise audit of an Equity Funding subsidiary that
the fraud actually came to light.”) (citing Dirks, 463 U.S. at 669 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
37.

Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654.

38.

Id. (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977)).

39.

Dirks, 463 U.S. 654 (quoting Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 473).

40.

Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655–56 (quoting In re Dirks, 21 SEC Docket 1401, 1410
n.42 (1981)).

41.

Dirks, 463 U.S. 656 (quoting Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 1974)).

42.

Id. at 662.

43.

Id.

44.

Id. at 667.

45.

Id.
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a personal or reputational benefit, or to make a gift to Dirks. Consequently, the Supreme Court’s analysis in Salman centers on the Second
and Ninth Circuits’ uneven application of the principles enunciated in
Dirks. 46

II. Mirror Opposites: United States v. Newman
& Salman v. United States
Because Salman and Newman both involved “tippee” liability, the
key issue in both cases was that the tippers did not receive any tangible
benefit for their tips. In both instances, the insiders tipped off family
members or professional friends who then tipped off others. Eventually,
“remote tippees” down the line traded on the material nonpublic information. 47 The “misappropriation doctrine” of insider trading, which is
“when a [non-insider] trades on or tips material nonpublic information
in breach of a duty to the information source,” 48 encompasses situations
like Salman and Newman.
The “misappropriation theory” 49 is distinct from the “classical
theory” of insider trading in which “a corporate insider . . . trades ‘in
the corporation’s securities on the basis of material, nonpublic information about the corporation,’ for his or her own benefit.” 50 In the “misappropriation doctrine,” as Justice Alito explained, “the tippee acquires
the tipper’s duty to disclose or abstain from trading if the tippee knows
the information was disclosed in breach of the tipper’s duty.” 51 Further,
“the tippee may commit securities fraud by trading in disregard of that
knowledge.” 52 This is so because, as the Second Circuit noted, “the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the notion of ‘a general duty between all
participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material,

46.

Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 425 (2016).

47.

Id. at 423–24 (“Salman received lucrative trading tips from an extended
family member, who had received the information from Salman’s brother-inlaw.”); United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2014)
(“[Defendants were] three and four levels removed from the inside tipper,
respectively.”).

48.

Wang & Steinberg, supra note 23, at § 5.4, 411.

49.

See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652–53 (1997) (explaining that
the misappropriation theory defines securities fraud as misappropriation of
confidential information in breach of a duty to the source).

50.

Id. (quoting Newman, 773 F.3d at 445).

51.

Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 423.

52.

Id.
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nonpublic information.’” 53 Thus, to be guilty of insider trading, the tippee must know that the insider breached a duty by giving the tip. Irrespective of the form of insider trading, the elements are the same for
both the classical theory and the misappropriation doctrine. 54
In Newman, two defendants traded in Dell and NVIDIA stock after
they heard news of the companies’ “earnings numbers before they were
publicly released.” 55 This generated large windfalls for their respective
hedge funds. 56 In the Dell trade, the insider shared inside information
with a former Dell coworker who by that time was working on Wall
Street. 57 The Government introduced evidence “that the [Dell] insider
sought career advice from his ‘friend’ and that his friend edited the
insider’s resume and sent it to a Wall Street recruiter.” 58 In the NVIDIA
trade, the insider shared information with a friend from church with
whom he “occasionally socialized.” 59 Neither the former Dell employee
nor the church friend traded on the inside information, but after several
steps down the chain, the “hedge fund managers . . learned the information and used it to trade in Dell and NVIDIA.” 60
Newman went up to the Second Circuit on appeal because the
defendants argued that “the district court erred in failing to instruct
the jury that it must find that a tippee knew that the insider disclosed
confidential information in exchange for a personal benefit.” 61 The Government insisted that “Newman and Chiasson were criminally liable for
insider trading because, as sophisticated traders, they must have known
that information was disclosed by insiders in breach of a fiduciary duty,

53.

Newman, 773 F.3d at 445 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,
233 (1980)).

54.

Id. at 446 (citing SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 285–86 (2d. Cir. 2012)).

55.

Id. at 443.

56.

See Jon Eisenberg, “Friends” Who Trade on Inside Information: How
United States v. Newman Changes the Law, K&L Gates (Apr. 20, 2015),
http://www.klgates.com/friends-who-trade-on-inside-information-how-unitedstates-v-newman-changes-the-law-04-20-2015/ [https://perma.cc/5LBGZPU5] (“Newman involved two defendants who traded in Dell and NVIDIA
and, as a result of those trades, made $4 million and $68 million for their
funds.”).

57.

Id.

58.

Id.

59.

Id.

60.

Id.; see also United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2014)
(“Newman and Chiasson were several steps removed from the corporate
insiders and there was no evidence that either was aware of the source of the
inside information.”).

61.

Newman, 773 F.3d at 442 (emphasis added).
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and not for any legitimate corporate purpose.” 62 But the Second Circuit
did not agree; instead, it overturned the convictions on the grounds
“that the district court’s instruction failed to accurately advise the jury
of the law.” 63
After reading the Newman opinion, it is apparent that the Second
Circuit was reluctant to expand insider-trading liability beyond its established parameters. For example, the Court explained “that the Government has not cited, nor have we found, a single case in which tippees
as remote as Newman and Chiasson have been held criminally liable for
insider trading.” 64 Further, the Court cautioned that, “although the
Government might like the law to be different, nothing in the law requires a symmetry of information in the nation’s securities markets.”65
We may, in turn, read Newman as a departure from Dirks because the
Second Circuit held that “the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the tippee knew that an insider disclosed confidential
information and that he did so in exchange for a personal benefit.”66
Requiring concrete proof that a tippee “knew” the tipper made the tip
in exchange for a “personal benefit” is a considerably more difficult test
when it comes to prosecuting “remote tippees;” but whether this is
sound policy is the province of the next Part. 67 Still, it is necessary to
note that the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Salman occurred
alongside the Second Circuit’s radical deviation in Newman. The key
takeaway from Newman is the Second Circuit’s holding that a jury may
only infer a “personal benefit” if there is proof of “a meaningfully close
personal relationship that generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or
similarly valuable nature.” 68 But whether Newman remains good law
after Salman is not entirely clear. 69
62.

Id. at 443–44.

63.

Id. at 450.

64.

Id. at 448.

65.

Id. at 448–49.

66.

Id. at 442.

67.

Infra Part III.

68.

Newman, 773 F.3d at 452; but see Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420,
422 (2016) (“To the extent the Second Circuit held that the tipper must also
receive something of a ‘pecuniary or similarly valuable nature’ in exchange
for a gift to family or friends . . . we agree with the Ninth Circuit that this
requirement is inconsistent with Dirks.”) (quoting Newman, 773 F.3d at 452).

69.

See Jen Wieczner, Here’s What the Supreme Court Insider Trading Ruling
Means for Hedge Funds, Fortune (Dec. 6, 2016), http://fortune.com/
2016/12/06/supreme-court-insider-trading-salman-hedge-fund/ [https://
perma.cc/4QC7-5F9W] (“The Salman decision wouldn’t have been enough
to put Newman in jail because ‘this case does not implicate those issues,’ the
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In Salman, Maher Kara worked for the healthcare group at Citigroup and began to share inside information about the company’s mergers and acquisitions with his brother, Michael Kara. 70 Early on, Maher
suspected that Michael was trading on the information, but later, after
a course of years, he concluded that Michael was indeed making illegal
trades. 71 Michael also began sharing this information with Bassam Salman, who, in the meantime, had become Maher’s brother-in-law after
Maher’s marriage to his sister. 72 Salman and an accomplice eventually
received a windfall of over $1.5 million from their illegal trades, 73 and
it was clear Salman knew the source of the information. According to
the Government, “it was also important to Michael that [Salman knew]
that Maher was the tipper; Michael hoped it would make Maher seem
more powerful and prosperous in the eyes of the Salman family.” 74 In
Part III I argue that this hankering for “recognition” is a tell-tale sign
that the tipper received a “personal benefit.” We should have faith in
the fact-finding process to search out evidence of a tipper’s desire for
“recognition” (as it did in Salman). If the Government can prove that
the tipper desired “recognition” 75 in exchange for their tip, whether reputational, altruistic, or professional, then that should be enough to satisfy the “personal benefit” test.
Justice Alito’s opinion begins by reiterating that the test is
“whether the tipper breached a fiduciary duty by disclosing the information . . . for a personal benefit [which] . . . a jury can infer . . . where
the tipper receives something of value,” including a gift of information
to “a trading relative or friend.” 76 Salman’s central argument was that
“he [could not] be held liable as a tippee because the tipper . . . did not
personally receive money or property in exchange for the tips and thus
did not personally benefit from them.” 77 In other words, Salman offered
a pure “pecuniary gain” reading of the Dirks “personal benefit”
Court wrote in a footnote to its opinion Tuesday. Indeed, the Salman decision doesn’t clearly define what the Supreme Court considers a ‘friend.’”).
70.

Brief for the United States at 3, Salman, 137 S. Ct. 420 (No. 15-628).

71.

Id.

72.

Id. at 5.

73.

Id.

74.

Id. at 6.

75.

The Oxford English Living Dictionary defines recognition as “[a]ppreciation
or acclaim for an achievement, service or ability.” Recognition, Oxford
Dictionaries, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/recognition
[https://perma.cc/S9DV-FA2K] (last visited Feb. 19, 2017).

76.

Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 423 (2016) (quoting Dirks v. SEC,
463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983)).

77.

Id. at 424.
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standard. But, in Michael Kara’s own words, his insider brother gave
him “timely information that the average person does not have access
to,” including “access to stocks, options, and [things] . . . the average
person would never have or dream of.” 78
Despite this palpable advantage, Salman raised three predominant
claims to innocence: (1) in the criminal-fraud context, the Government
must prove that the fraudster personally obtained money or property,
and the same standard should apply to insider trading; (2) defining a
gift as a personal benefit is “indeterminate, because liability may turn
on facts such as the closeness of the relationship between tipper and
tippee and the tipper’s purpose for disclosure;” and (3) defining a gift
as a personal benefit is also “overbroad, because the Government may
avoid having to prove a concrete personal benefit by simply arguing
that the tipper meant to give a gift to the tippee.” 79 Salman also raised
a few ancillary arguments, citing “constitutional concerns” and difficulties arising out of “remote tippee” scenarios. 80
On the other side, the Government argued “that a gift of confidential information to anyone, not just a ‘trading relative or friend,’ is
enough to prove securities fraud.” 81 The Court was not willing to extend
the Dirks “personal benefit” test that far, but it still quickly sounded
the death knell for Salman’s arguments. The Court held that, in Salman’s case, “the tipper benefit[ted] personally because giving a gift of
trading information is the same thing as trading by the tipper followed
by a gift of the proceeds.” 82 And although the Court conceded that “in
some factual circumstances assessing liability for gift-giving will be difficult,” 83 it concluded that “Salman’s conduct [was] in the heartland of
Dirks’s rule concerning gifts.” 84 Outside of this gift-giving “heartland,”
we can only speculate as to how far future courts will extend the Dirks
“personal benefit” test, especially since the Salman Court reaffirmed it
on the narrowest possible grounds.

III. Insider-Trading Enforcement after Salman
Before delving into some hypothetical “remote tippee” scenarios
post-Salman, it is necessary to address the policy issues that underlie
all insider-trading prosecutions. Among these policy considerations are:
78.

Id. at 425.

79.

Id. at 426.

80.

Id.

81.

Id.

82.

Id. at 428.

83.

Id. at 428–29.

84.

Id. at 429.
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(1) adhering to the rule of lenity and providing clear standards to ensure
just imposition of criminal liability under the securities laws; 85 (2) permitting market participants to develop insights about companies without fear of criminal repercussions, which facilitates market efficiency
and effectuates pricing mechanisms; 86 (3) dismantling the uncertainty
surrounding the “patchwork of judicial decisions cobbling together, on
a case-by-case basis, what conduct gives rise to liability;” 87 (4) respecting separation of powers, especially because Rule 10b-5 “does not expressly prohibit insider trading”; 88 (5) preventing the “crowding out”
effect 89 and earnings manipulation that springs from insider trading and
impairs market efficiency; 90 and (6) ensuring that securities markets are
not “rigged in favor of the well-connected and the influential.” 91
These competing interests center on two major concerns: (1) prioritizing Congressional statutes over “judge-made” law; and (2) protecting
market efficiency and integrity, which mean different things to different

85.

See Brief of the Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the N.Y.
Council of Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5,
Salman, 137 S. Ct. 420 (No. 15-628) (“[T]he Ninth Circuit’s rule would
criminalize a broad swath of conduct as to which Section 10(b) is at best
ambiguous, the rule of lenity compels a narrower reading of that provision
here.”); see also Brief of the NYU Center on the Admin. of Criminal Law as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 3, Salman, 137 S. Ct. 420 (No.
15-628) (“Criminal liability should not turn on a fact-finder’s evaluation of
how friendly a tipper and tippee are, or whether a tippee’s assistance to the
tipper meets some arbitrary threshold of significance.”).

86.

See Brief of Amicus Curiae Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n in Support of
Neither Party at 10, Salman, 137 S. Ct. 420 (No. 15-628) (“If the markets
are to operate with optimal efficiency, it is critical that the analyst (and any
compliance officer asked to assist) be able to quickly and reliably determine
whether trading and recommendations are permitted or prohibited in the
circumstances presented.”).

87.

Brief of Amicus Curiae Mark Cuban in Support of Petitioner at 2, Salman,
137 S. Ct. 420 (No. 15-628).

88.

Brief for Amicus Curiae Cato Inst. in Support of Petitioner at 2, Salman,
137 S. Ct. 420 (No. 15-628).

89.

See Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading, in The Concise Encyclopedia
of Economics (David R. Henderson ed., 2008), http://www.econlib
.org/library/Enc/InsiderTrading.html [https://perma.cc/25EQ-797W] (“The
‘outside’ search for information [by analysts] is more socially valuable, even
if it is occasionally more costly, [because] trading by corporate insiders may
crowd out securities research on external factors.”) (emphasis added).

90.

See Brief of Amicus Curiae Richard D. Freer in Support of Respondent at
12, Salman, 137 S. Ct. 420 (No. 15-628) (“[I]n developed economies, insider
trading can harm pricing efficiency.”).

91.

Brief of Occupy the SEC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 2,
Salman, 137 S. Ct. 420 (No. 15-628).
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people. 92 The most common judicial precedent cited in opposition to an
all-encompassing insider-trading prohibition comes from Justice Powell’s majority opinion in Dirks: “The SEC expressly recognized that
‘[t]he value to the entire market of [analysts’] efforts cannot be gainsaid;
market efficiency in pricing is significantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze information, and thus the analyst’s work
redounds to the benefit of all investors.’” 93 This market efficiency consideration is a major impediment to the adoption of a hardline stance
against all insider trading, particularly when market analysts extract
inside information and remote tippees trade on it. 94 But, as we will see,
this apprehension to apply stiff insider trading laws because they might
stifle the work of true market professionals is misguided. After all, “market professionals . . . spend significant time and resources digging up
non-inside information about the economy and individual firms,” but
“if insider trading were legal, it’s possible that all this work may not be
worth it [and] . . . if these market professionals leave the market as a
result, it could lead to much less efficient markets.” 95 In other words,
market professionals who conduct business the old-fashioned way are
largely responsible for keeping markets efficient, not the inside traders
who prey on the “efficient capital markets” argument as a form of trade
protectionism for their own crooked advantage. 96

92.

See, e.g., Wang & Steinberg, supra note 23, at § 2.2.2, 20 (“Arguably,
market efficiency is similarly enhanced by all insider trading, even by executives of the issuer. All such trading will move prices in the correct direction,
especially if the market discerns that insider trading is taking place.”); but
see Bainbridge, supra note 25, at 183 (“The problem is that while derivatively informed [i.e. “insider trading”] can affect price, it functions slowly
and sporadically. Given the inefficiency of derivatively informed trading, the
market efficiency justification for insider trading loses much of its force.”).

93.

Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 n.17 (1983).

94.

Doug Bandow, It’s Time to Legalize Insider Trading, Forbes (Jan. 20, 2011,
1:10 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2011/01/20/legalize-insider-tradingeconomics-opinions-contributors-doug-bandow.html [https://perma.cc/
R9UM-BPPQ] (“The objective of insider trading laws is counter-intuitive
[sic]: prevent people from using and markets from adjusting to the most
accurate and timely information. The rules target “non-public” information, a
legal, not economic concept. As a result, we are supposed to make today’s
trades based on yesterday’s information.”).

95.

Christopher Matthews, Why is Insider Trading Even Illegal?, Time (July
26, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/07/26/why-is-insider-trading-evenillegal/ [https://perma.cc/FGR7-MJ4X].

96.

See generally George W. Dent, Why Legalized Insider Trading Would Be a
Disaster, 38 Del. J. Corp. L. 247, 272 (2013) (arguing that “the efficiency
of stock markets depends on a steady flow of trading. Insider trading by
issuers would discourage trading, with resultant damage to the efficiency of
stock markets but no offsetting benefits to investors.”).
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Importantly, the “Salman case . . . didn’t deal with a second aspect
of Newman, which made it more difficult for prosecutors to pursue cases
against traders who received confidential information second- or thirdhand.” 97 Thus, the most important issue to address in this Part is the
precise issue that Justice Alito avoided in the Salman opinion; namely,
what courts should do in factually-difficult scenarios since “[d]etermining whether an insider personally benefits from a particular disclosure
. . . will not always be easy.” 98 This Part scrutinizes three of these
potential “personal benefit” scenarios.
On October 5, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in
Salman. 99 During oral argument, two justices posed three separate questions to counsel concerning how the “personal benefit” test would apply
in given hypothetical scenarios. To fully grasp how the “personal benefit” test might apply in these scenarios post-Salman, we must further
analyze them outside the constraints of oral argument.
Initially, at the outset of the Government’s argument, Chief Justice
Roberts raised the following hypothetical: What if a group of “people
[are] all going away for the weekend, [and they say to the insider] why
don’t you join us? [And the insider responds] I can’t, I’m working on
this Google thing.” 100 Justice Roberts remarked that “you wouldn’t call
that a gift. You’d call it a social interchange. And maybe it’s . . . something he should have been more careful about saying, but it’s quite
different than a gift.” 101 This is thought-provoking for two reasons: (1)
after this observation, Chief Justice Roberts asked the Government’s
solicitor whether this would be a “personal benefit,” and the solicitor
replied that it would not; and (2) Chief Justice Roberts declared that
“however you read Dirks, it certainly doesn’t go beyond gifts.” 102
Naturally, Chief Justice Roberts observed that “it’s kind of a hazy
line to draw . . . between something that you characterize as a gift and
something that would be characterized as social interaction.” 103 But
Justice Breyer was not as muddled, because he stated that “if you give
[inside information] to . . . anyone in the world . . . whom you happen
to know, and you believe that person will trade on it, that is for a
personal advantage.” 104 It appears then, at least to Justice Breyer, that
97.

Viswanatha & Kendall, supra note 17.

98.

Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 429 (2016) (quoting Dirks, 463
U.S. at 664).

99.

Oral Argument, supra note 9.

100. Id. at 27:15.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 27:38.
103. Id. at 28:46.
104. Id. at 30:07.
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the gravamen of the “personal benefit” test is whether the tipper believes that the tippee will trade on the information. In this case, it is
necessary to ask why else would a tipper reveal inside information unless she expected the tippee to trade on it? Clearly, in this “social interchange,” the tipper did not intentionally reveal any information; but
this type of innocuous banter is not what the securities laws are designed to prevent. Rather, this hypothetical helps frame the actual evil
to be remedied by an insider-trading prohibition: deterrence of tips by
individuals who want “recognition,” pecuniary or otherwise, for providing a scarce resource. 105 When we view information as a thing of value,
it is easier to understand why the misuse of that information is a crime.
By way of example, attorneys are often in the business of handling
client funds. Further, probably all attorneys know folks who have fallen
on hard times financially. But just because the attorney possesses the
client funds does not mean the attorney can give the money away to
the struggling folks she knows. The attorney is a fiduciary and must
hold those funds in trust for her client. Inside information is no different. The insider holds the information in trust for the corporation. In
the context of the marketplace, bullish information means there is money to be made and bearish information means there are losses to be
avoided. 106 Information, quite literally, has so many dollar signs attached to it that it might as well be hard currency. But whether that information can benefit a needy person (or a not-so-needy person) in the
insider’s circle (or not in their circle) is of no consequence because it
does not belong to the insider, it belongs to the corporation. It isn’t for
the insider to decide whether to reveal it because it doesn’t belong to
them, and that’s why it’s a crime. The next hypothetical will further
our understanding of why an insider (or tippee under the “misappropriation doctrine”) who wants “recognition” for possessing information is
actually receiving a “personal benefit,” and why a “recognition” test,
rather than a “personal benefit” test, makes more sense for remote tippees.
Later in oral argument, Justice Alito raised the following hypothetical: “Suppose . . . the insider is walking down the street and sees
someone who has a really unhappy look on his face and says, I want to
do something to make this person’s day. And so he provides the inside
information to that person and says, you can make some money if you

105. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
106. See generally Bearish and Bullish Definition, N. Am. Derivatives Exch.,
Inc., https://www.nadex.com/learning-center/glossary/bearish-and-bullishdefinition [https://perma.cc/82HJ-4ZPW] (last visited Feb. 16, 2017)
(“Traders have long used the terms ‘bearish’ and ‘bullish’ to describe two
things: their own feelings about a market and what they feel is a general
mood in the market as a whole.”).
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trade on this.” 107 Justice Alito then asked the Government solicitor if
this would be a violation of the “personal benefit” test, and the solicitor
replied “yes.” 108 The tipper in this scenario is not related to the person
on the street; they are not even friends. In fact, they just met. But the
tipper wants to bring some good fortune to this person on the street.
And this is exactly what the law is designed to prevent: it may be
factually difficult to prove that the tipper wanted “recognition” as the
individual who cheered up the unhappy person on the street, but it will
not be as difficult as proving that the tippee “knew” that the insider’s
disclosure violated a fiduciary duty. A jury could infer from the tipper’s
course of conduct that she wanted to “save the day” and cheer up the
unhappy person on the street, and this amounts to “recognition.”
“Recognition,” as a term of art, is distinct from the “gift theory” of
liability. “Recognition” means that a tipper wants reputation or status
as someone who is “in the know,” or as someone who has information
no one else has. This is a “personal benefit” because, if insider trading
was legal, insiders would prioritize their own interests over the interest
of the firm, which is the entity that actually produces economic value.
Clearly, society has a greater interest in the well-being of the firm than
in the well-being of the insider. As Dent argues, “[t]he prospect of huge
trading profits would tempt managers to alter many decisions, causing
damage to the firm in ways that would be virtually impossible for corporate monitors to detect.” 109 And, as Langevoort explains, “[a] hard
question in the law of insider trading is how to characterize the behavior
of someone who we think should have known better but may have lacked the contemporaneous appreciation ordinarily associated with scienter.” 110 The answer to these questions is a “recognition” based rule that
seeks to establish the tipper’s reputation as someone who discloses reliable inside information. If each tippee that trades on information from
a tipper who seeks “recognition” 111 can be held liable, this should
significantly deter even remote tippees from trading on information that
the industry knows has been appropriated.

107. Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 31:12.
108. Id. at 31:34.
109. Dent, supra note 96, at 248.
110. Donald C. Langevoort, What Were They Thinking? Insider Trading and the
Scienter Requirement, in Research Handbook On Insider Trading 52
(Stephen M. Bainbridge ed., 2013), http://scholarship.law.georgetown
.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2018&context=facpub [https://perma.cc/
YE2K-ZAL8].
111. Clearly, establishing this “recognition” would require wiretapping and other
investigatory techniques that reveal what goes on behind closed doors.
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A “recognition” based rule would prohibit disclosures that are not
made for a corporate purpose, and under the “misappropriation doctrine,” any remote tippee who trades on illegally-disclosed information
would subject themselves and the original tipper to liability. This is so
because a successful trade, i.e. a gain or an avoided loss, would trace
back to the information source and would give them “recognition” as
someone who has valuable and reliable information. This type of “recognition” gives someone status in market circles, and this is the type of
circuity that has led to a culture of unfair advantage. 112
This “recognition” based rule is broader than the “gift theory” of
liability because a tippee does not have to know that the tipper intended the disclosure to be a gift of information; the tippee only has to
know that the information yielded a profit prior to public disclosure,
which gives the tipper “recognition” as a dependable source. Once the
tippee trades, both the tipper and the tippee are subject to liability
whether or not they know of each other’s existence or motivations. If
the Government can produce viable evidence of a tipper’s reputation in
the industry, then there is no reason to eschew a “recognition” based
rule that sweeps into remote-tippee territory in a way Salman couldn’t.
Justice Alito also raised the last hypothetical, which was perhaps a
tip-off that he would be the one to ultimately write the opinion: “So
the person with inside information has had a few drinks at the country
club and is talking to some friends and discloses the inside information
[to them] . . . One of the friends then trades on the information. Now,
what would you have to prove as to the mental state of the tipper and
the tippee?” 113 First, let us ask the question a second time, why would
anyone reveal inside information unless they expected that someone
might trade on it? After this last hypothetical, it is much clearer that
individuals with inside information want “recognition” as someone who
has a thing of value that others don’t have. If others can obtain value
from this individual’s information, it puts them in a position of power
as someone who possesses scarce resources. This is why insider trading
is theft, because these scarce resources do not belong to the person who
extracts the value from them, whether for themselves or another.
There is a culture of insider trading on Wall Street that journalists
have covered for a long time. 114 There are people who “play the game”
112. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Why Insider Trading is Wrong, N.Y. Times
DealBook (Apr. 11, 2011, 3:51 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/
04/11/why-is-insider-trading-wrong/ [https://perma.cc/CUF2-YAPU]
(explaining that Wall Street bankers, corporate lawyers, and FDA chemists
have all taken advantage of inside information).
113. Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 40:09.
114. See, e.g., Patrick Radden Keefe, Making Insider Trading Legal, New
Yorker (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/
making-insider-trading-legal [https://perma.cc/UPQ7-PVBY] (“Because
there are so many hedge funds, each with its own army of analysts, the trick
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and others who simply “play by the rules.” For instance, “[c]ompany
insiders share tips for many reasons, not just financial compensation:
the person they share the information with may be a friend or a family
member, someone they want to impress, [or] someone they owe a favor.” 115 In other words, the person who shares the information wants
“recognition” for being the one who shared the information; they want
to impress someone, help their friends or family, or make good on a
previous debt, perhaps from a time someone gave them inside information. If those who “play by the rules” and only trade on public information are ever to enjoy the fruits of their integrity, Congress must pass
legislation that sufficiently deters individuals who want “recognition”
for tipping information that does not belong to them. This sounds a bit
nebulous and more than a bit suspicious, but we won’t know the true
damage caused by insider trading until we have clear guidelines that
prosecutors can use to attack the problem at a macro level.
There will always be the camps who believe that information is a
private-property right, and in more than a few contexts it is, but when
it comes to the publicly-traded securities of publicly-held companies,
information belongs to everyone with a pension, 401(k), portfolio, or
fund, regardless of the size, or those who are not currently trading in
the market but someday desire to. 116 The Salman Court did not extend
the rule beyond the limits established in Dirks, nor should they have.
In the name of separation of powers, this is a movement that Congress
must spearhead. But, as a public policy matter, the time has come for
the federal government to take a hardline stance on insider trading,
because there’s no telling how many more Newman’s are waiting in the
wings of appellate courts, and how many insiders are out there seeking
“recognition” and industry status as players with reliable information.

Conclusion
The major takeaway from Salman is that the Court reaffirmed its
narrow holding in Dirks: a gift of inside information to a trading relative
or friend is enough to establish a “personal benefit” to the tipper.
Outside of this narrow holding, however, Salman does not do much else.
But that statement underscores Salman’s practical thrust, because as
the Government’s solicitor explained during oral argument, the great
majority of insider-trading cases involve a tip of inside information to
a trading relative or friend. 117 As far as legal rules are concerned, Salman
is to find some nugget of information that the rest of the market doesn’t
know. This is where the culture of insider trading took hold.”).
115. Id.
116. Law students are one group that immediately comes to mind.
117. Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 45:00 (“This involves the classic, prototypical situation that actually arises in the real world and gets prosecuted.
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is not groundbreaking; but in the grand scheme of insider-trading jurisprudence, it validates the Government’s significant latitude to prosecute the most common situations in which insider trading occurs.
Salman may not extend insider-trading liability to its logical vanishing point, but it should certainly give pause to those corporate insiders willing to benefit their family and friends at the expense of the
trading public and their own issuing corporations. A step towards a fair
marketplace is always a step in the right direction, but critics who raise
separation of powers and clarity concerns have legitimate qualms with
the manner in which existing insider-trading jurisprudence has developed. Although the Salman Court undoubtedly reached the correct
result in a legally-justifiable fashion, it is time for Congressional action
to amend § 10(b) to clearly reflect that insider trading is a crime, and
that it is a crime that necessitates a statute with a comprehensive
sweep. Reports of rampant insider trading 118 means some market participants do not respect the law in its current form, and “if we desire
respect for the law, we must first make the law respectable.” 119
James Walsh †

There are very few cases that involve [the] hypothetical of somebody distributing inside information [anonymously to many different people].”).
118. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Study Asserts Startling Numbers of Insider Trading
Rogues, CNBC (Jun. 17, 2014, 3:15 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/06/
17/study-asserts-startling-numbers-of-insider-trading-rogues.html [https://
perma.cc/3FRY-2RZZ] (“A quarter of all public company deals may involve
some kind of insider trading, according to [a] study by two professors at the
Stern School of Business at New York University and one professor from
McGill University.”).
119. Avers Dissolution Faces Steel Trust, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 16,
1912, at 14 (quoting Louis D. Brandeis’s remarks at the Cleveland Athletic
Club).
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